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Abstract
Pluralism has many meanings. An assessment of the need for logical
pluralism with respect to scientic knowledge requires insights in its do-
main of application. So rst a specic form of epistemic pluralism will be
defended. Knowledge turns out a patchwork of knowledge chunks. These
serve descriptive as well as evaluative functions, may have competitors
within the knowledge system, interact with each other, and display a
characteristic dynamics caused by new information as well as by mutual
readjustment. Logics play a role in the organization of the chunks, in their
applications and in the exchange of information between them. Epistemic
pluralism causes a specic form of logical pluralism.
Against this background, the occurrence of inconsistencies will be dis-
cussed together with required reactions and systematic ways to explicate
them. Finally, the place of inconsistencies in the sciences will be consid-
ered. Seven theses will be proposed and argued for. The implications of
each of these for pluralism will be considered.
The general tenet is that paraconsistency plays an important role,
bound to become more explicit in the future, but that the occurrence of
inconsistencies does not basically aect the need for pluralism.
1 Introduction
It is the aim of this paper to explore links between pluralism and inconsistency
toleration in science. There are many forms of pluralism. The form that interests
us most in the present context is logical pluralism, roughly that several logics
play a role in human reasoning in general and in science in particular.
Allow me to start with a personal comment. I have been a convinced logical
pluralist for many years and have defended my position in several papers. Yet,
reactions to those papers seem to rely on a misunderstanding of my position.
This caused some sadness, but especially guilt about the obvious failure to
express myself adequately. My present diagnosis is that my position will become
Part of the ideas of this paper were presented at the workshop \The Place of inconsis-
tent science in scientic pluralism", held 5{6 September 2016 at the Universidad Nacional
Autonoma de Mexico, Ciudad de Mexico, Mexico. I am grateful to the audience for questions
and valuable suggestions and to the referee for useful corrections and comments.
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clearer if I explain rst what I mean by epistemic pluralism|see Section 2|and
next, in Section 3, clarify the way in which this inuences the intended notion
of logical pluralism.
The claim from the title, that inconsistency is no big deal, states the position
that the advent of paraconsistent logics did not cause a dramatic change with
respect to logical pluralism. I do not mean that the advent of paraconsistent
logics was insignicant. Quite to the contrary. Notwithstanding the heavy
opposition, even hostility, induced by the advent of paraconsistent logics, these
logics have known an ever greater popularity and turned out to have many
applications. Today they are generally recognized as closure operations that may
be unpopular with some scholars and that are clearly weaker than some (though
not all) other closure operations, but that are obviously sensible. I do not believe
that paraconsistent logics, let alone a single one, will in the future be seen as the
standard of reasoning, or even as the standard of deductive reasoning. Yet I am
convinced that a large number of paraconsistent theories will originate in the
near future and will become popular in view of their interesting properties|
I shall occasionally give examples in subsequent sections. So I expect that
paraconsistent logics will play a much greater role in the future. Yet, their
advent and expected popularity does not, in my view, oer any new arguments
for logical pluralism or any new challenges to it.
This seems the best point to insert two warnings. The rst is that paracon-
sistency and pluralism are both fascinating and complex and that they concern
basic views on logic and on knowledge. Such views are often implicit in the
writings as well as in the thinking of scholars. So misunderstanding is likely
and the reader better treads carefully, especially if he or she considers some
claims as obviously mistaken or even nonsensical.
The second warning concerns conventions. Unless specied dierently, I
shall use the word \logic" in the broad sense. It will denote any function
L : }(W) ! }(W), also noted as   7! CnL( )|so a function that assigns a
consequence set CnL( ) to every premise set  . The second convention is that
(i) the metalanguage in this paper will always be classical and (ii) \A is false"
will function as classical negation of \A is true". This may seem dubious, but
I shall argue later in this paper that it is possible as well as sensible to follow
the convention.
2 Epistemic Pluralism
The traditional Western ideal of knowledge sees knowledge as a unied and
monolithic body, which is justied by a mechanism that may be external or
internal with respect to the body of knowledge. There are several views on this
body. I shall not spell them out but rather argue that the traditional Western
ideal is mistaken in several respects.
(1) The body of knowledge forms a patchwork rather than a unity. It com-
prises a large variety of domains. There are the `sciences': mathematics, physics,
chemistry, biology, psychology, sociology, economy, . . . , and these are split up
in disciplines and subdisciplines. The so-called theories of these subdisciplines
are partial and incomplete in the sense that more knowledge is hoped for in the
future. Of these theories only a few are axiomatized and those that are, are
aected by the limitative theorems; they are not provably consistent and they
Humana.Mente Journal of Philosophical Studies 32, 149{177 3
are incomplete in several senses.
Apart from the odd qualities of the `theories', they are only in part amalga-
mated. Many couples of disciplines and subdisciplines are simply unrelated.
(2) The situation is heavily complicated by the fact that alternatives are
available for many theories. In mathematics the examples are well-known: set
theories, geometries, and so on. Sometimes an alternative is simply an extension
of an older theory. Sometimes the alternatives are incompatible with each other.
Sometimes it is unknown whether they are compatible. Empirical theories are
nearly always competing with each other.1 String theories vs. elementary par-
ticle theories form a ready example. Yet the example is misleading in that it
concerns a well-known and striking conict in a fundamental discipline. When-
ever one looks closer into any discipline or subdiscipline, variants are readily
located. In the social sciences they are overwhelming.
(3) A unique concrete framework for the whole body of knowledge is absent.
As a result, a standard procedure for extending our knowledge in such a way
that some parts are better connected is absent. For example, even materialistic
and reductionistic psychologists have no clear idea of the physical explanation
of human behaviour and do not know an obvious way that would lead to such
an explanation.
This should not be misunderstood. Pursuing unication is extremely im-
portant. It is an essential motor of the `internal' dynamics of disciplines. The
pursuit raises specic problems for certain theories. One may, for example, at-
tempt to adjust cognitive psychology to specic insights from brain physiology,
or one may try to develop a mathematical tool for the benet of an empirical
discipline. Such steps are extremely important. However, in the absence of a
unifying framework, no standard procedures are available and the unifying steps
will require a creative problem solving process.2
So unication is important and a unied body of knowledge is a sensible
ideal. Yet, one cannot understand the present pluralism in the sciences and
the need for logical pluralism by concentrating on that ideal and neglecting the
present state of knowledge.
(4) The situation is even more dramatic in view of the central role of methods
and cognitive values. Descriptive knowledge theories need to be justied, re-
jected, transformed, and sometimes selected among competitors. The required
methods and values are not God given.3 Quite to the contrary. Methods are
delineated by methodological theories and these are subject to transformation.
The transformations may be caused by reasoning|so ultimately by an attempt
to unication|but are more often originated by empirical data or other changes
to descriptive knowledge. Cognitive values are equally subject to transforma-
tion. Moreover, as for other values, their application to novel or somewhat
complex cases requires interpretation, specication, and sometimes even modi-
cation.
1As no (actual) empirical theories are axiomatized, variants to theories are only recognized
if striking and fundamental dierences occur.
2By this I mean a process that necessarily will consist of a sequence of problem solving
situations (or contexts) as well as a variety of `derived' problems, at least some of which result
from analysing the reasons for not obtaining an answer to some of the involved questions. The
more general picture is sketched in several publications [3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 11, 26, 27, 28, 29].
3They are not given by our intuitions either. Actual intuitions are acquired by experience,
and hence unable to provide a watertight warrant. The belief in warranting intuitions depends
on the pre-critical idea that a God would have implanted them in us.
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The justication of methods and cognitive values, or of theories about them,
involves many hard problems. I present only a few examples without much
discussion. There are many philosophical problems, the most popular one being
the so-called fact-norm gap. Central in this is the role of descriptive knowledge
in the justication of methods. One may try to explicate this role by an end-
means reasoning. However, this leads us to even more fundamental philosophical
disagreements. Thus the goal of acquiring knowledge may be related to truth|
it is by the traditional denition of knowledge. Some will prefer a pragmatic
justication; others a justication in terms of problem solving, as was popular
in the second half of last century, most explicitly in Larry Laudan's approach
[24].4 Next to the philosophical problems there are computational problems
that surface in certain applications of the methods and values. The reason for
this is that the reasoning necessarily proceeds in predicative terms, but that it
is moreover always defeasible. I oered examples elsewhere [7], showing that
the results of applications of the methods do not form a semi-recursive set.
What is the impact of all this? Changes to one theory often cause changes
to others. Obviously changes to theories on methods and cognitive values aect
the justication of descriptive theories. And the opposite eect also occurs.
Methodological theories have factual presuppositions that may be falsied or
may become extremely unlikely.
(5) Descriptive theories, methodological theories, conceptual systems or lan-
guages, and logics are modied and replaced. Change in one of the elements
often causes change in others. No one with any knowledge of the history of the
sciences will have any doubt about this claim, except perhaps where it pertains
to logics. Even the changes to logics are clear enough for the non-prejudged ob-
server, but those logicians who believe in the existence of a unique `true logic',
will try to reason them away. Of course, this does not entail that they are
mistaken. So let us consider the claim unsubstantiated in as far as logics are
concerned. There is more to come on this.
(6) The changes mentioned in (5) are largely unpredictable. It is unpre-
dictable which problems will occur before they do occur. More importantly,
before those problems occur, and often a good while thereafter, it is impossible
to delineate the set from which the modied theories, methods, and so on, will
be chosen.
The point is especially consequential where it concerns conceptual changes.
As long as the problem that causes the change does not occur, scientists usually
cannot even imagine the conceptual situation that will result from the change,
let alone the eect of this situation on descriptive theories, methods and values,
languages and logics. So the situation which is taken to be actual after the
change, could not by anyone have been seen as a possibility a while earlier.5
The implications for claims on logical possibility and related topics is evident. If
logical possibilities merely concern the meanings of logical symbols, as is the case
in the semantics of a logic or in model theory, they are fully irrelevant for the
possible state of the world as expressed by denoting terms. If logical possibilities
also pertain to the meaning of those terms, they are language dependent and
hence fail to involve future conceptual changes. It is almost embarrassing to say
so. Whoever stated anything dierent after Carnap's work on state descriptions
4A nice illustration of the discussions that might result was also presented by Laudan [25].
5Nice relevant work was produced by Nicholas Rescher [32, 33, 9].
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[22] should at least have adduced some good arguments.
It is usually not dicult to incorporate older conceptual systems into newer
ones. The old views thus become logical possibilities. In general, it is often easy
enough to forge dierent conceptual systems, even if they contradict each other,
into a single one. They contradict each other because their presuppositions
contradict each other and the presuppositions usually boil down to existence
claims concerning entities (objects, facts, processes, . . . ), sets of entities, sets
of tuples of entities, etc. If two conceptual systems do not dier too much,
for example in that they require the same entities, it is sucient to widen the
possibilities in such a way that the presuppositions become mere possibilities.
So the limits of a logical space depend on the entities it is dened over and on
its unseen presuppositions.
(7) The changes to theories, methods, languages and logics require reasoning
about those entities. So it may be said that the reasoning proceeds at a higher
level.6 A level is dened by (at least) a language (and conceptual system), a
logic and a set of methods|methods may be seen as defeasible consequence
relations that extend premise sets.
Claim (7) does not require that there is a highest level which is stable, or that
a higher level does or does not share its logic with lower levels, or that higher
levels are justied (or even dened) independently of lower levels. Obviously,
there is no highest level. Indeed, one may ask questions about any level: about
its concepts, its logic, e.g. inference rules, the correctness of a specic reasoning
sequence, and so on. Moreover, given any non-standard problem, no one can
predict the highest level that one will have to reach in order to solve the problem.
Where, at the beginning of this section, I denied the existence of a unied and
monolithic body of knowledge, the claim was denitely vague and ambiguous. I
hope to have repaired this by the specications introduced within this section.
An unannounced conclusion is the absence of a stable or nal highest level
and the fact that it is unpredictable to which `height' a problem solving process
will (have to) move before reaching a solution. Levels will turn up again in the
next section.
3 Logical Pluralism
Whether logical pluralism is required or not is determined by the function of
logic with respect to theories. Three functions have to be distinguished: a
logic may function as the underlying logic of a theory, a logic may be invoked
to explicate the reasoning that goes on in applications of theories, and a logic
may be invoked to explicate the reasoning that leads to transferring statements
between theories|which consequences of one theory are transmitted to the
other in order to strengthen the latter theory's consequences.
These three functions seem to cover the whole domain, especially if the \the-
ories" are not seen as comprising all knowledge within a certain domain,7 but
as chunks of knowledge, where \knowledge" is loosely dened to cover methods
and values. The chunks need some internal organization, they need to be ap-
6There are all kinds of objections against hierarchies of levels, but I do not think that they
apply to the existence of such levels as introduced in the text.
7In view of (2) from Section 2, this is often impossible anyway.
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plied, separately or more often in combination. The description of a method or
of cognitive values may be seen as a theory, organized by a logic.
Logicians like to dene theories as the result of applying a closure opera-
tion on a set of non-logical axioms. The set of theorems of the theory is then
CnL( ) = fA j   `L Ag, the set of consequences derivable by the underlying
logic L from the set of non-logical axioms  .
As we all know, most theories, whether mathematical or empirical, are pre-
sented in such a way that the reasoning and proofs are kept `informal', which
here means non-formalized. Traditionally, most logicians seem to have believed
that `logic', in more recent periods specied as classical logic, CL, provides the
correct explication for the informal reasoning. Yet, there is a set of well-studied
mathematical theories that are explicitly meant to have intuitionistic logic, IL,
or a similar system as its underlying logic. Other logics often serve a rather
`theoretical' function in this respect in that they have no popular applications.
This holds, for example, for relevant, paraconsistent, adaptive, and other logics.
Where they are the underlying logics of actual theories, the theories are formu-
lated by logicians, usually to make a philosophical or technical point, but are
not applied by (a signicant number of) scholars in the domains to which the
theories pertain.
The second function of logics was to explicate the reasoning involved in
applications of theories. Where the domain is non-mathematical, scholars hardly
seem to care, leaving the explication to the logicians. Again, the majority of
the latter seem to believe that CL oers the right explication, but hardly ever
attempt to actually oer an explication. They apparently do so because they
believe thatCL is the `true logic' anyway. This is not very convincing, especially
as hardly any reserve is shown in cases where CL obviously runs into trouble,
as is for example the case for Quantum Mechanics.
The third and nal function was to explicate the reasoning that regulates
the transfer between theories, or also between knowledge chunks. In specic
cases, one theory is seen as extending the other, for example when mechanics is
considered to incorporate analysis. This may be considered as sensible, but it is
still odd that mathematical theorems would be seen as theorems of mechanics.
So it seems more natural to opt for an inferential approach: inferences justied
by analysis allow one to derive theorems of mechanics from other such theorems
(or axioms, where the term makes sense). Still, the construction is not obvious
and if the deductive logic is merely CL, the oddities one tries to avoid will
obviously be unavoidable.
Where the theories or knowledge chunks contradict each other, as is the
case for counterfactual reasoning, such an inferential approach is not only odd
but trivializing. Special systems have been developed, which I prefer to la-
bel procedural|procedures are introduced below. Examples of such systems
were developed by Nicholas Rescher, partly with Ruth Manor [31, 34], by Peter
Schotch and Raymond Jennings [36], by Bryson Brown and Graham Priest [21].
Many other procedures are obviously possible.8
The provisional conclusion is that the choice of a logic should mainly be as-
sessed in view of the explication it provides. Stressing the notion of explication
is essential. What is `out there' is actual reasoning, not a domain that can be
8The aim of adaptive logics, introduced below, is to characterize all such procedures, and
many more, by dynamic proof procedures and a selection semantics, possibly under a trans-
lation.
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described, neither a matter of fact nor a platonic heaven. Indeed, the explican-
dum unavoidably contains mistakes and there is a normative dimension. We are
not interested in describing the reasoning as it occurred, but in its justiable
reconstruction. This holds for all three functions of logic.
With all this in mind, let us turn to the traditional classication of logic.
First there is deductive reasoning, which is determined by the meaning of terms;
formal deductive reasoning is determined by the meanings of the logical terms,
informal deductive reasoning by the meanings of the non-logical terms (or re-
ferring terms). Next there is defeasible reasoning, which basically comes to
`methodological' reasoning. The correctness of defeasible reasoning is not de-
termined by the meanings of any linguistic entities, although it obviously is
inuenced by them. The correctness of defeasible reasoning is determined by
the criteria that govern the justication of methods: whether their results serves
their purpose, the quality of those results, the eciency of the process that leads
to them, and so on.
So let us, nally, consider logical pluralism in terms of this classication.
Even in the domain of formal deductive reasoning, an overwhelming amount
of arguments supports the need for logical pluralism. For one thing, there is a
plurality of logical terms that go beyond the scope of the common systems called
logics and that occur in specic linguistic contexts. Examples are the sundry
kinds of modalities|alethic, deontic, pragmatic, etc.|of causal relations, of
time and tense operators, and so on. Moreover, none of these logical terms
seems to be unique. Does anyone even have the beginning of an argument for
the thesis that only one negation, one implication, one conjunction, . . . occurs
in actual reasoning? And there are a couple of serious counterarguments. One
of them is that all those monologists adduce at best theoretical arguments, but
never an empirical study of actual reasoning or even of actual texts. That,
moreover, monologists quarrel among themselves about the logic that is the one
and only|classical, intuitionist, relevant, etc.|is not really an objection, but
neither does it support their so-called self-evident position.
But apparently monologism is being softened. More recent monologist brands
actually advertise logics in which a plurality of logical symbols occurs. Typically
most relevant logicians admit that there are several sensible implications and
that some of them serve specic purposes better than others. Thus Anderson,
Belnap and Dunn admit that R rather than E is required for empirical theo-
ries [1] and many other relevant logicians argued for picking a specic relevant
implication for a specic purpose [35, 20, 45]. And once there is a manifold of
implications, there is a manifold of denable negations (like A ! ?) disjunc-
tions (like A! B for a unary ) and conjunctions (like (A! B) for a unary
). Of course this puts logical monists in a situation that closely resembles the
one of pluralists which monists often nd objectionable: that one needs crite-
ria to determine which (sequences of) words from natural language should be
explicated by which (sequences of) formal symbols.
If the one and only logic has a manifold of unambiguous logical terms, there
is obviously no reason why all of them should occur in all knowledge chunks (or
theories) or in all reasoning that concerns the application of knowledge chunks or
the transfer between them. So the explication of reasoning in dierent contexts
proceeds in terms of sublogics of the one and only logic. But why is that simpler
or better in any other way than the situation in which mutually incompatible
logics do the job in the dierent contexts? By mutually incompatible logics I
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mean logics that cannot be forged into sublogics of the same logic.
Next, consider a situation in which logic has to serve one of its three func-
tions. Why should a unique logic oer a suitable explication of the involved
logical terms? Clearly several logics may be equally good in this respect, either
because they lead to the same results, viz. the same consequence set, or be-
cause none of the consequence sets is arguably superior. The argument would
seem inescapable even if we were dealing with a description, and it is the more
convincing as we are dealing with an explication. I cannot see in which way
a monist might rebut the argument, unless by starting from the presupposi-
tion that all correct reasoning is the monopoly of a single logic|call this the
monopoly presupposition.
Suppose that a logic L provides a suitable explication of the logical terms
that occur in a context in which we reason about the beauty of Bach's Cello
Suites. Why then should L be a suitable explication of the logical terms that
occur in the context in which we reason about L? Clearly the non-logical terms
of both contexts are very dierent. So why, if one does not rely on the monopoly
presupposition, should the logical terms be identical? So why then should the
metatheory of a logic L have L itself as its logic?9
If dierent contexts require dierent logics, there is no foolproof trick to build
an embracing logic that equally well explicates the reasoning in the dierent
contexts. The point is that logics dene consequence relations. For this reason,
there is no warrant that the embracing logic is a conservative extension of the
embraced logics. Put dierently, joining the logics might change the meaning
of some of the logical terms.
Some may try to save the idea of a one and only logic by seeing it as a so-
called umbrella logic. Given a set S of logics, the umbrella logic would determine
which member of S is adequate in which context. This way out does not save
logical monism. The umbrella logic is clearly not a logic in the usual sense, but
rather an instruction or a method for choosing logics. It does not even assign a
unique consequence set to every premise set, among other things because several
members of S may be equally suitable for certain contexts.
All these, it seems to me, are good arguments against dierent brands of
logical monism and jointly form a good reason to consider pluralism as the
only viable alternative. As far as non-formal reasoning is concerned, monism
does not even seem sensible. Nor was it defended by anyone as far as I know.
Apart from the fact that most arguments concerning formal reasoning carry over
here, referring terms are vague and ambiguous, and moreover theory-laden.10
Most of what was said about deductive reasoning also carries over to defeasible
reasoning, as do the insights on epistemic pluralism. More importantly, the idea
that methods would be a priori was replaced by the view that they are learned
in scientic practice, in which we learn how to learn [38]. An oddity that may
be added at this point is that defeasible logics may function as underlying logics
of complex theories.11
The present discussion would be incomplete if I did not consider the question:
9It is interesting to check whether a logic can function as the underlying logic of its own
metatheory and, if so, how adequate or complete the resulting metatheory is. But is this more
than a technical feature of the logic?
10This does not result in incommensurability and does not exclude communication.
11In the case of adaptive logics, for example, theories may be up to 11-complex [15, 39].
Several examples have been published and more are underway [40, 41, 12, 2].
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How to justify the choice between logics for a specic explication? I already
hinted towards some answers, but let me recapitulate explicitly. Let me begin
by admitting that lots of work still has to be done in studying properties of
logics that determine their suitability for a specic situation. Yet, as we start
from reasoning to be explicated, a few general guidelines are obvious. Clearly
the explication should not trivialize the context. Next, it should recapture the
bulk of the given reasoning. There is no need for trying to recapture `as much
as possible' and denitely no need for determining the logic that maximizes the
consequence set. The task is a matter of satiscing rather than optimizing. In
practice one should pick a choice and look for counterarguments; a `pragmatic'
and provisional choice will do.12
4 When Inconsistency Emerges
Consider a theory T = h ;CLi that is meant as and believed to be consistent
and hence is given CL as its underlying logic. Suppose that T turns out in-
consistent. So CnCL( ) = W whence T is trivial. As a result, one will try to
devise a consistent replacement T 0 = h 0;CLi for T . This does not mean that
T is abandoned and T 0 is built from scratch. Quite to the contrary, (P1) one
will reason from T in order to locate the inconsistencies in it and in order to
obtain a maximally consistent `interpretation' of T ,13 and (P2) one will try to
devise one or several consistent replacements T 0 from there|the two steps are
given a name for future reference.
Solving problem (P1) requires a systematic and formal method, whereas the
choices involved in (P2) are not justiable on logical grounds but depend on
specic properties of   and possibly on new information.14 It is the aim of this
section to review a few candidates for (P1).
A blunt approach consists in going paraconsistent. This means that, in
T = h ;CLi, one replaces CL by a paraconsistent logic P which is dened over
the same language as CL. A logic P is paraconsistent i A;:A `P B is invalid.
So P invalidates certainCL-inferences. Actually, nearly all paraconsistent logics
invalidate Disjunctive Syllogism (from A _B and :A to derive B).15
If P is a Tarski logic,16 then CnP( ) is too poor. This may be seen by
considering a simple propositional example.
 1 = fp; q;:p _ r;:q _ s;:qg
As  1 is (explicitly) inconsistent, CnCL( 1) is trivial. A maximally consistent
12There is a huge number of inconsistency-adaptive logics. Over the years, quite a few rules
of thumb were acquired for choosing one of those logics for a specic purpose. It would be
too odd a digression to discuss those rules of thumb here.
13The quotation marks warn the reader that an informal interpretation is meant, not an
interpretation as provided by a semantics. The informal interpretation delineates a certain
set of statements that the premises arm.
14Actually, the matter is slightly more complicated in that several approaches may lead to
\a maximally consistent `interpretation' of T"; see the passage on \other corrective adaptive
logics" below in the text.
15Disjunctive Syllogism together with Addition (to derive A_B from A) warrant Ex Falso
Quodlibet, also called Explosion (to derive B from A and :A) if the consequence relation is
Transitive.
16A logic L is Tarski i it is reexive (   CnL( )), monotonic (CnL( )  CnL( [) for
all ) and transitive (if   CnL( ) then CnL()  CnL( )).
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`interpretation' of  1 warrants that r is a consequence of it. Indeed, if all
propositional letters are consistent whenever  1 does not require them to be
inconsistent, then p is true and :p false, and so the truth of :p _ r guarantees
that r is true.
It is easily seen that no Tarski logic oers an adequate approach. Let L
be a paraconsistent Tarski logic. Case 1: L validates Addition. So Disjunctive
Syllogism is invalid in L as explained in footnote 15. Case 2: Addition is invalid
in L. Then L does not oer a maximally consistent interpretation of  1 because
innitely many members of CnCL( 1) are absent from CnL( 1) but are veried
by the minimally abnormal L-models of  1, for example the formula p _ A for
all A.17
A dierent approach proceeds in terms of a procedure. This is a set of
instructions that lead from a premise set to a construction, which is a proof-like
entity. An instruction should be seen as a couple consisting of a rule and a
permission or obligation that depends on (i) the premise set and (ii) the state of
the construction. The form of this permission or obligation is something like: if
A is a premise and X1; : : : ; Xn occur in the construction and Y1; : : : ; Ym do not,
then one may/should add Z to the construction|the X, Y and Z are certain
entities from which the construction is built.18
Procedures were introduced, for example by Paul Weingartner [46]. They
have certain advantages over logics in that they allow one, for example, to dene
goal directed CL-proofs [17]. A weaker procedure denes the logic (in the broad
sense) CL  [10]. The latter is just like the procedure for CL except that Ex
Falso Quodlibet is invalid.
No procedure will be spelled out in the present paper, but the main idea may
be claried as follows. A CL -consequence is a formula that can be constructed
from the premises by the procedure. For this reason CL  is able to validate
Addition as well as Disjunctive Syllogism without validating Ex Falso Quodlibet.
Let  2 = fp;:pg. There is a construction for  2 ` p _ q: as the goal is p _ q,
look for a premise of which p_ q is a positive part|a notion dened by Schutte
[37]. There is no such premise but the procedure allows one to transform the
`goal set' [p _ q] to two goal sets, [p] and [q]. These allow one to introduce a
premise of which p, respectively q, is a positive part. As p itself is a premise, the
CL -construction succeeds, whence  2 `CL  p _ q. By a similar construction,
p_ q;:p `CL  q because the premise p_ q allows one to obtain q if one obtains
:p and that is itself a premise. But there is no way to obtain  2 `CL  q: the
goal set [q] cannot be further analysed and there is no premise of which q is a
positive part.
Let us move on to the next approach: inconsistency-adaptive logics [13].
There is a paraconsistent logic P that functions as the so-called lower limit :
whatever is derivable by P is unconditionally derivable. The central adaptive
idea is that abnormalities19 are considered as false unless and until shown oth-
erwise.
17This is the situation for the (somewhat special) logic AN [30]. As expected, the adaptive
version, called ANA, validates all those formulas.
18If instructions are taken as primitive, the rules by which usual logic proofs are built may
be dened as instructions combined with a universal permission. Both procedures and the
usual logics are logics in the broad sense as dened in Section 1.
19The abnormalities of inconsistency-adaptive logics are inconsistencies, or rather specic
forms of them. In the present section, I shall only consider abnormalities of the form 9(A^:A),
in which 9 abbreviates an existential quantier over every variable free in A.
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Lines of the annotated dynamic proofs are like lines of usual annotated
proofs, but there is a further element on each line, viz. a condition. Premises
are introduced on the empty condition. The rules of inferences of the lower limit
are unconditionally valid. Next, the gain provided by the adaptive logic may be
characterized, at the base level, by the following central deductive mechanism.
A _ 9(B ^ :B) 
A  [ f9(B ^ :B)g
So when the disjunction of a formula A and an abnormality 9(B^:B) is derived
on a condition , the abnormality may be pushed to the condition. The meaning
of this is that the formula A is derivable provided the premises allow one to
consider the abnormality as well as the other members of the condition as false.
Also central to the dynamic proofs is the marking denition: lines are marked
in view of the minimal disjunctions of abnormalities that are unconditionally
derivable|derivable on the condition ;|from the premises. If a line is marked,
its formula is taken not to be derivable by the insights provided by the stage of
the proof|the proof moves to the next stage whenever a line is added.20 Next
to this derivability at a stage, there is a notion of nal derivability, which is
dened in terms of possible extensions of proofs. That nal derivability is not
decidable at the predicative level is the reason why the proofs are dynamic in
the rst place. The semantics of adaptive logics is a selection semantics. Models
of the premise set are selected in view of the set of abnormalities they verify; the
adaptive semantic consequences are the formulas veried by all selected models.
It is helpful to specify the following. A paraconsistent logic P may be related
to CL by saying that CL validates certain rules on top of those validated by
P. Inconsistency-adaptive logics validate certain applications of such rules|
which applications are validated depends on the disjunctions of abnormalities
that are derivable from the premise set by the lower limit logic. Looking at the
same picture from the opposite point of view, replacing CL by a paraconsistent
logic comes to considering certain CL-rules as invalid;21 replacing CL by an
inconsistency-adaptive logic comes to the same, except that applications of the
invalidated rules are retained whenever the involved formulas can be taken to
be consistent.22
The strengths of inconsistency-adaptive logics are threefold. (i) Their dy-
namic proof theory explicates defeasible reasoning|the point is substantiated in
many papers [13]. (ii) Inconsistency-adaptive logics dene consequence sets that
are much less dependent on the formulation than for example CL -consequence
sets. (iii) There is a large variety of inconsistency-adaptive logics, the variation
pertaining to the lower limit logic, the abnormalities, the strategies, and the
way in which inconsistency-adaptive logics are combined with each other.
Problem (P1) does not require deductive inferences but methodological de-
cisions, and that is precisely what adaptive logics are able to explicate. This
also claries why it is an advantage that there is a multiplicity of inconsistency-
adaptive logics: the choices to be made do not concern the meanings of logical
symbols but are methodological in nature.
20So a proof stage may be seen as a sequence of lines and a dynamic proof as a chain of
stages.
21For pragmatic reasons CL is chosen as the upper limit logic.
22This is the intuitive idea. Inconsistency-adaptive logics originated by making the idea
precise and systematic.
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Comparing inconsistency-adaptive logics with the procedure CL  provides
useful insight. Where   is an inconsistent premise set, CL  avoids triviality
because the procedure analyses the goal into `targets', and analyses premises in
view of those targets, but does not allow one to derive formulas that are not
obtained as targets.23 The behaviour of an inconsistency-adaptive logic depends
on the set of formulas that can be taken to behave consistently. This, in turn,
is determined by the lower limit consequence set of the premises.
A further way to handle inconsistent premise sets are (what I like to call)
Rescher-Manor mechanisms [31, 34]; many variants, both `at' and `prioritized'
were meanwhile studied [18, 19]. Rescher-Manor mechanisms proceed in terms
of maximal consistent subsets (m.c.s.) of the premise set. The m.c.s. of, for
example,  1 are fp;:p _ r;:q _ s;:qg and fp; q;:p _ r;:q _ sg. A formula
is a Weak consequence of   i it is a CL-consequences of a m.c.s. of  ; it is
a Strong consequence of   i it is a CL-consequences of all m.c.s. of  ; and
there are more kinds of consequences. Note that Rescher-Manor mechanisms
are heavily dependent on the formulation of the premises. Thus both p and r
are among the Strong consequences of  1, but neither is a Strong consequence
of fp ^ q;:p _ r;:q _ s;:qg.
Rescher-Manor mechanisms are characterized by an inconsistency-adaptive
logic under a translation [5, 42, 43]. This is useful. At the predicative level
Rescher-Manor mechanisms are computationally hopeless; the set of consistent
subsets of a predicative premise set is not in general semi-recursive. The adap-
tive characterization provides the mechanisms with a dynamic proof theory. On
the one hand, this denes the complex consequence set; on the other hand it
explicates our reasoning towards it.
There are other means to handle the problem (P1) and I only mention one
of my preferred ways: other corrective adaptive logics|these are adaptive log-
ics that assign to certain premise sets a consequence set that is non-trivial and
moreover `interprets' the premises `as consistently as possible'.24 The `inter-
pretation' should be obtained on formal logical grounds. Thus, if the premises
arm (p ^ :p) _ (q ^ :q) and no other relevant stu about p and q, then the
two disjuncts should be treated on a par.
It turns out [14] that, in order to obtain a maximally consistent `interpre-
tation' of a premise set, it is not always required to proceed in paraconsistent
terms. That :A is true in case A is also true may be seen as a negation glut|
CL-models that verify A falsify :A, whereas here :A is true. Similarly, that
:A is false in case A is also false true may be seen as a negation gap. If both
A and B are true, and A^B is false, we have a conjunction gap; a conjunction
glut obtains if either A or B is false, and A^B is true. And so on for all other
logical symbols.
Consider, by way of example,
 3 = fp; r;:q _ :r; (p ^ r)  q;:p _ sg :
 3 has obviously paraconsistent models|models of logics that allow for negation
gluts. However, it has also models of logics that allow for conjunction gaps and
23Referring to a previous example, q is not derivable from fp;:pg because q is the only
target and is not a positive part of one of the premises.
24The quotation marks indicate that the phrase is not unambiguous. The phrase is dis-
ambiguated by the adaptive strategy, each strategy dening a sensible way to interpret the
phrase.
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it has models of logics that allow for disjunction gluts. So allowing for other
abnormalities than negation gluts and minimizing those abnormalities results,
for some premise sets, in minimally abnormal `interpretations'. These form a
sensible starting point for solving (P2), a starting point just as sensible as a
minimally inconsistent `interpretation' of  3.
25
Some corrective adaptive logics do not minimize gluts and gaps with re-
spect to logical symbols, but minimize ambiguities with respect to non-logical
symbols|I skip the technical trick to realize this. Next, all such corrective adap-
tive logics, those that minimize gluts and gaps as well as those that minimize
abnormalities may be combined|some combinations combine two of them, or
three of them, . . . , up to all of them. The lower limit logic is called zero
logic, CL;, because nothing is a consequence of anything else|even p 0CL; p.
However, adaptive zero logic, for example CL;m, assigns a sensible minimally
abnormal `interpretation' to every premise set.
Two more comments and then I move on to the next topic. First, none
of the preceding can be seen as an application of CL itself. Even when the
consequence relations are dened in terms of CL, as is the case for the Rescher-
Manor mechanisms, they are obviously dierent from CL because they assign
non-trivial consequence sets to at least some premise sets. The second comment
is that, with the exception of paraconsistent Tarski logics, all the approaches
assign to consistent premise sets exactly the same consequence set as CL assigns
to them. This is a further nice property which they all share, apart from being
paraconsistent. This also shows that, unlike what many classical logicians and
people like Peter Vickers [44] seem to think, one cannot see from texts that
their authors apply CL. All one can see is that they apply either CL or one of
those logics in the broad sense that assign to consistent premise sets the same
consequence set as CL. This is especially relevant when commenting on scholars
that did not know CL, which includes everyone who lived before 1900 but also
most scientists living thereafter.
5 Some Theses
In this section I try to summarize my position with respect to the questions in
the call for papers for this volume. Clarity and structure seem best served by
phrasing some theses with comments.
T1 Paraconsistent logics are required (i) where inconsistency emerges within
a theory or domain or between theories, (ii) for handling counterfactuals
and related notions (laws, causality, . . . ), and (iii) for handling interesting
inconsistent theories, whether empirical or mathematical.
Arguments for (i) are found in the history of the sciences. At this point,
I have again to warn the reader for a mistaken view, defended among others
by Peter Vickers in his otherwise very interesting book [44]. The view is that
scientists do not draw any consequences from inconsistencies, and hence that
the presence of Ex Falso Quodlibet in CL is harmless. The trouble is especially
with the second half. It stems from the mistaken claim that no consequences of
25Every premise set that requires a glut or gap or ambiguity to obtain|see below in the
text|is inconsistent. But that does not mean that the paraconsistent road is the only one or
even the best one.
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an inconsistency can be derived by CL as long as the inconsistency itself was not
derived. This is obviously wrong and naive. When an inconsistency is discovered
within a theory, one cannot consider the other statements that were derived by
CL from the theory as safe. The fact that predicative CL-consequence sets are
not semi-recursive and that there is no positive test for consistency|that the
set of consistent sets is not semi-recursive|turns the objection into a fatal one.
While, in T1, (ii) is a simple fact,26 (iii) might be debatable in view of
disagreements on what is interesting. It seems to me, for example, that it is in-
teresting that some inconsistent set theories are provably non-trivial, especially
as none of the `classical' set theories is provably non-trivial [20, 40, 41, 2].
Let us turn to consequences of T1 for logical pluralism. As was shown
in Section 4, there is a multiplicity of minimally abnormal interpretations of
theories. Several of these are viable in most contexts, viz. when dealing with
(P1) in connection with a specic inconsistent theory. It is correct that there
are some insights on the suitability of specic approaches and we should try to
increase these. One knows, for example that some lower limit logics are more
suitable than others for specic purposes. Empirical and mathematical theories
impose dierent demands in this respect. Similar insights allow one to rule out
certain adaptive logics for a given purpose. Moreover, the careful study of the
theory under consideration will often reveal specic demands and show certain
adaptive approaches inadequate|there is no foolproof method that adequately
solves (P1) for all situations. Still, a manifold of (adaptive and other) approaches
will in each specic case make sense and, more importantly, be the correct road
to a solution of (P1) that allows for an interesting solution to (P2).
The claims in the previous paragraph concern logics in the broad sense,
means to characterize methods. That there is a manifold of methods may not
come as astonishing. The situation is dierent for (ii) and (iii). My reference
section is terribly incomplete with respect to (iii), the number of underlying
logics is enormous and I do not see any way to rephrase all of the theories, or
even theories close to the available ones, in terms of a single underlying logic.
T2 It is unsettled whether our best future theories will be consistent or incon-
sistent.
One of the arguments, which I take as convincing, is that the complexity
of the world may prevent a consistent description in a denumerable language.
As humans are taken to be unable to handle non-denumerable languages, T2
follows. I must add, but I said so elsewhere, that I am unable to understand
consistent or inconsistent unless as a property of linguistic entities. So I fail to
understand Dialetheism as standardly dened. Of course, one may understand
it as stating the our best future theories will be inconsistent. I see no argument
that justies ruling this out as an actual possibility|not just a logical one.
What is the relevance for logical pluralism? One might dene `the true
logic' as the logic that will be suitable for our theories `at the end of time'. The
theories I have in mind are those that our successors will hold on the proverbial
day when the dynamics of science will have halted and all scientic problems
will have been answered. T2 rules out that one would be able to identify at
present `the true logic' in this sense. Even supposing that some or all of our
theories will be inconsistent at the end of time, I see nothing that would at
26Some denitions proceed in terms of modal logics, but the criteriology does not.
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present support the superiority of a specic paraconsistent logic over others.
So, in my view, even if `the true logic' exists, it is not knowable today.
Note also that, if it exists, the true logic in that sense is useless for our present
purposes and tasks. There is no reason why the logic that would underly all
our theories and their applications at the proverbial stable end of time would
have any use for us, who try to move from the present turmoil in the direction
of that stable state.
However, the situation is far worse than I depicted it. There is no reason at
all to believe that there will be a unique logic at the proverbial end of time. The
end state would be more than ideal enough if every theory were stable, if the
logics underlying applications was stable, and if the logics for transfer between
theories were stable. That all theories would have a dierent underlying logic,
that dierent kinds of applications would demand for a dierent logic, that a
diversity of logics would be required for the transfer between theories, all this
would not in the least diminish the ideal character of the end state.
What matters about a theory is its set of theorems. The way in which the
theorems are organized, respectively axiomatized, is far less important. It seems
to me that logicians would make themselves more useful by oering simple and
transparent means to organize a theory than by advertising their own true logic,
often the mere result of prejudice, speculation and lack of imagination.
T3 If an inconsistent theory T is `translated', without loss of discrimination,
into a consistent theory T 0, then T 0 allows for more discrimination than T .
I take it that there is no loss of discrimination when logically non-equivalent
formulas of T correspond to logically non-equivalent formulas of T 0. An example
of the intended translation is when the triad of possibilities
Px Px ^ :Px :Px
is replaced by the triad
Ppx ^ :Pnx Ppx ^ Pnx :Ppx
in which the subscripts refer conventionally to positive and negative. So the
inconsistency is removed from the logical space: a single unary predicate, which
denes an inconsistent logical space, is translated in terms of two unary predi-
cates.
Such translation is seldom possible. The only simple transformation by
which one seems to try to restore consistency is restriction. For set theory,
for example, certain entities, like the Russell set, were either removed from
the theory or were turned into entities of a special kind, like classes, which
have weaker properties, for example cannot be the rst element of a member
of the membership relation. Other transitions to a consistent theory require
more complex transformations to concepts, to empirical criteria, and so on. So
actually, there is a methodological pluralism in removing inconsistency.
T4 Where L is a paraconsistent logic and L1 is dened by the consistent L-
models, if   has L1-models, then CnL1( ) is non-trivial and, weird cases
aside, richer than CnL( ).
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A L-model is consistent i, for all formulas A, it falsies either A or :A.27
The L1-consequences of a premise set are the formulas veried by all consistent
L-models of the premises.
As   has L1-models, it oers one the choice between two sets of conventions,
those of L and those of L1. The latter choice results in a more complete de-
scription: as every L1-model of   is a L-model of  , CnL( )  CnL1( ) and,
some weird cases aside,28 CnL( )  CnL1( ).
Under normal conditions, L1 will validate more rules than L. The choice for
L1 will also aect the meaning of the negation: :A L1-entails \if also A, then
triviality". Even if this cannot be expressed in the language, we shall have \if
  `L1 :A, then   [ fAg `L1 B for all B". In this sense :A `rules out' A, etc.
Also, CnL1( ) may be a theory about any topic, for example the description of
a logic, viz. of the syntactic and or semantic consequence relation.
As far as logical pluralism is concerned, there is a reason to restrict it in the
described situation. Put more correctly, there is a reason to prefer CnL1( ) over
CnL( ). But that hardly aects our view on pluralism. Still, dialetheists may
balk. They may try to show that  , if well understood, is inconsistent anyway.
If they can show so, it was a mistake to think that   has L1-models. That's
excellent, but is not an objection to T4. Dialetheists may also argue that it is
better to stick to L because one might obtain new information, which extends
  and results in an inconsistent  0. The situation would for example change if
the inconsistent information were likely, but the mere possibility of inconsistent
information is not a good reason for staying paraconsistent. Just like the mere
possibility of dying is not a good reason for not buying a plane ticket.
T5 If some of the best theories are inconsistent, or if the best unied theory
is, then it is almost straightforward that one can describe the situation in
a way that is itself consistent.
Let me rst phrase the argument in terms of `levels'. Let T , be a theory.
That, for some A, both `T A and `T :A hold, does not entail that `T A
and 0T A and does not entail that, for some B, `T B and 0T B. Of course
it is possible that the theory T is dened in an odd way, which causes both
`T A and 0T A to hold. It is even possible that our usual notion of a theory is
deeply defective, and that both `T A and 0T A hold as an eect of that. (To be
honest, it is possible but unlikely; more unlikely than the inconsistency of Peano
Arithmetic for example.) But suppose that both `T A and 0T A hold and let
us write this as `M `T A and `M 0T A. Why should it follow that `M `T A
and 0M `T A hold? Or why should it follow that, for some B, `M `T B and
0M `T B hold? And, especially, how would such things follow?
So, as an argument for T5, I would invoke lack of imagination. Why can
we not talk about the situation, however inconsistent it may be, in a consistent
way? In terms of levels: What would prevent us to move up to a level where
we can talk consistently about the inconsistent situation?
I have heard objections against phrasing the argument in terms of levels.
The existence of levels would be problematic. Whether this holds water or
not, the objection is supercial. Just put the talk at all levels into a single
27The case where L is dened over a language with several unary logical symbols is safely
left to the reader.
28An example of a weird case is where   is the set of all formulas veried by a L1-model.
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language and rephrase the problem. To illustrate the matter, I need some
technical claims. It is easy enough to dene a modal logic with the property
that negations within the scope of modalities are paraconsistent and negations
outside that scope are classical. So fA;:Ag is a trivial set, but fA;:Ag
is not. Similarly, it is easy enough to dene a modal inconsistency-adaptive
logic that presupposes consistency unless and until proven otherwise, but does
so rst for the highest levels. So fA;:Ag would be preferred to hold over
fA;:Ag, the latter would be preferred to hold over fA;:Ag, etc. So,
for any nite premise set, however inconsistent it be, there will be a layer of
modalities that is consistent.
Is this foolproof? Of course not, no construction is. And if things go badly
wrong, so will dialetheism, whatever its purity.
With respect to logical pluralism, I have argued that a consistent highest
level oers a coordinated umbrella view on a plurality of theories and coordi-
nating metatheories, etc., with a diversity of underlying logics.
T3 states that, in certain circumstances, an inconsistent description can be
translated into a consistent one. As is stated by T4, there are circumstances
in which choosing an explosive logic oers a richer (and consistent) description.
Finally, T5 shows that one may consistently describe the patchwork of theories
(or chunks) and the plurality of logics that functions within it.
T6 To dene higher level inconsistency in terms of lower level inconsistency is
objectionable.
It is for example objectionable to stipulate that   0L A i   `L :A. Let us
have a closer look. Consider a logic like LP, in which Excluded Middle holds: in
every model M either A or :A has a designated value. In such a semantics, one
may safely dene M 1 A as M  :A. Indeed, if M assigns a non-designated
value to A, then it assigns a designated value to :A; so M  :A and hence
M 1 A by the denition. If M assigns a designated value to both A and :A,
then M  A will hold together with M 1 A. Next, dene    A i, for all
models M of  , M  A; for a suitable logic of the metalanguage, it follows that
  2 A i, for a model M of  , M 1 A. So p;:p  p and p;:p 2 p.
Why is it objectionable to proceed thus? There may very well be a prob-
lem with our semantic metatheory and the problem may cause the semantic
consequence relation to be inconsistent. Similarly for the syntactic consequence
relation. Such inconsistency should be taken seriously. But for this inconsis-
tency to occur, it is neither sucient nor necessary that both p and :p are
consequences of the premise set. Incidentally, spreading inconsistency over the
levels blocks the advantages of the consistent description from T4.29
T7 Where T = h ;Li is rejected, modied or replaced, the rejection, modica-
tion and replacement may aect L as much as  .
The main argument for T7 was already adduced for T2: if the true logic
exists, it depends in part on the described domain. Actually, a similar argument
29Somewhat similar, although less objectionable, Graham Priest denes \A is false" as \:A
is true". Note that it is possible to use \A is false" as the classical negation of \A is true"
and M 1 A (M falsies A) as the classical negation of M  A (M veries A). Even less
objectionable, but still related, is that, in LP and CLuNs and similar logics, :(A ^ :A)
`means' :A _ ::A rather than the denial of the contradiction A ^ :A.
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pertaining to the language rather than the logic was presented ages ago by
Hempel [23].
The lesson with respect to logical pluralism is small but novel: there is no
need for the underlying logic(s) to be stable over time.
6 In Conclusion
What preceded should be seen as an attempt to sketch the role of paraconsistent
logics within a pluralistic outlook. That I reject, and argued against, classical,
dialetheist, intuitionist, or other monistic outlooks should not be misunderstood.
Disagreeing does not prevent one from learning from the opponent. Nor should
it prevent one from encouraging the opponent to elaborate and correct his or her
outlook. As far as I am concerned, this holds especially for dialetheists. What
matters is the nal full system. A nal full system is very remote today, for every
outlook. All we have today are scattered knowledge bunches, each with many
parts unexplored. So the situation described as the general epistemological
situation in Section 2, is exactly the situation in the philosophy of logic: a
patchwork of knowledge bunches, with a variety of logics in all three functions.
New outlooks often start by taking over most patches from an older outlook,
rejecting some other patches of that outlook. The missing bits are either lled
out by the result of new ideas and research, or are taken from a dierent older
outlook. Now and then new results from one of the competing outlooks are so
basic that all outlooks add the result to their own patchwork, possibly only after
a certain period of time and possibly with some reserve.
Paraconsistent logics are a typical example of a result now accepted by all
outlooks. They are at least accepted as formal systems, respectively closure
operations. Thirty years ago some logicians raised even technical objections to
the formal systems and treated scholars interested in paraconsistent systems
slightly worse than pedophiles. Meanwhile, the paraconsistent outlooks|there
are indeed quite a few|had originated as described above. All outlooks rejected
the classical outlook. Yet, some replaced CL by a dierent `single true logic',
or stayed convinced that locating the true logic is a crucial adequacy condition.
Others gave up logical monism. While such choices are clearly inspired by
our ideological preferences, it would be reckless to consider our own choice as
beyond criticism. By the time that our patchwork gets unied, if it ever will,
some present theses, and even present patches, will be rejected. Moreover, and
as suggested before, we need other outlooks in order to improve and strengthen
ours. On the one hand, adherents of other outlooks will be eager to locate the
weak spots in ours. On the other hand, whether adherents of a dierent outlook
are able to solve their problems may provide crucial information for modifying
our own outlook. For this reason, for example, I am eager to see whether
dialetheists are able to remove the weak spots that I consider as critical for the
viability of their outlook.
Let us quickly glance at the questions raised by the editors in their call for
papers|these may or may not be retained in the introductory paper for the
present volume. I do not see any particularly interesting connection between
pluralism and inconsistency toleration. Nor do I think that pluralism entails a
specic type of commitment towards inconsistency toleration. As was argued
in Section 5, unlike the monist, the pluralist has room for a nal and stable end
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state that is fully unied but nevertheless contains classical theories along with
paraconsistent ones. However, while the pluralist can allow for more possibilities
than the monist, there is no need for the pluralist to adhere to a logically `mixed'
end state.
I denitely do not think that particular inconsistency toleration commit-
ments entail a particular kind of scientic pluralism. In my view, we should try
to replace inconsistent knowledge chunks by consistent ones, we should strive to-
wards unication of the knowledge chunks, we should try to maximally integrate
them, for example by devising theories from which several present theories may
be derived, and the resulting structure will be more preferable as it is simpler
(in a sense to be determined). However, the values advertised in the previous
statement cannot be realized now. Possibly they will never be realized. The
interplay between the complexity of the world and the connes of human in-
formation handling capacities may impose severe restrictions; they clearly do
now and they may do forever. So inconsistency should be tolerated where that
interplay requires it, and similarly for giving in on coherence or unication. We
should try to realize each of those values and avoid to connect, for example, a
lack of consistency with a lack of coherence.
We obviously need to distinguish between dierent types of inconsistency tol-
eration commitments. Especially important is the distinction between `nally'
inconsistent theories as compared to transitionally occurring inconsistency. The
transitional ones, which regularly crop up in one or other knowledge chunk, are
the ones we try to eliminate. Everyone who leaves room for nally inconsistent
theories|to avoid misunderstanding, I state that I do|is in need of criteria for
the distinction.
The question which inconsistent but non-trivial scientic theories are well
understood by which types of paraconsistent approaches cannot be answered in
this paper. I have hinted to a few rules of thumb in the last footnote of Section
3, but we denitely do not know enough about the matter at present.
Allow me to end this paper with a comment on what I take to be a justied
form of optimism. The advent of paraconsistent logics has opened a wide domain
of research, which has branches in mathematics, in the empirical sciences, in
scientic methodology|independent of this also in the humanities, including the
arts, culture, and philosophy in the broad sense. Some osprings of research in
paraconsistency, like adaptive logics, have led to theories that, on the one hand,
have a much higher complexity than the usual semi-recursive theories and, on
the other hand, handle forms of complexity that are very dierent from the
ones handled by second order logics. Indirectly, this evolution is an argument
in favour of logical pluralism. Now that those new types of theories came into
reach, next to new types of reasoning, why should we rewrite the old theories,
along with old reasoning forms, and forge all into the new formats? Knowledge
would be transparent and simple if one logic would perform all functions. Yet,
there is no need for a single logic, and certainly no urgency. There are dierent
ways to integrate theories into a coherent unity.
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